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Abstract  19 
The emergence of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) in Wuhan 20 
City, China, late in December 2019 is another example of an emerging zoonotic virus that 21 
threatens public health and international travel and commerce. When such a virus emerges, there 22 
is often insufficient specific information available on mechanisms of virus dissemination from 23 
animal to human or from person to person, on the level or route of infection transmissibility or of 24 
viral release in body secretions/excretions, and on the survival of virus in aerosols or on surfaces. 25 
The effectiveness of available virucidal agents and hygiene practices as interventions for 26 
disrupting the spread of infection and the associated diseases may not be clear for the emergent 27 
virus. In the present review, we recommend approaches for infection prevention and control for 28 
SARS-CoV-2 which can be invoked based on pre-existing data on microbicidal and hygiene 29 
effectiveness for related and unrelated enveloped viruses.     30 
 31 
Late in December 2019, cases of pneumonia began appearing in Wuhan City, Hubei Province, 32 
China. By early January 2020, these cases were attributed to a novel coronavirus that was 33 
temporarily referred to as 2019 Novel Coronavirus (2019-nCoV)1. This member of the 34 
Coronaviridae family has now officially been named SARS-CoV-22. As of April 17, 20203, 35 
there have been over 2,074,529 confirmed cases globally, with 139,378 deaths (mortality rate of 36 
~6.7%). This emerging virus, and the associated disease (COVID-19), are not only impacting 37 
public health, but also international commerce and travel. As with the Middle East Respiratory 38 
Syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) that emerged in Saudi Arabia in 2012 and the Severe Acute 39 
Respiratory Syndrome coronavirus (SARS-CoV) that emerged in China in early 2003, SARS-40 
CoV-2 is considered a zoonosis, with bats suspected as the primary host species (Table 1)4.  41 
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   The Coronaviridae family is just one of several families of enveloped viruses that have 42 
emerged/re-emerged in recent years5-9 (Table 1). While the list of viruses in Table 1 is not 43 
intended to be comprehensive, it contains most of the virus families attributed to the World 44 
Health Organization’s current list of disease priorities needing urgent R&D attention10 (i.e., 45 
MERS and SARS [Coronaviridae], Crimean Congo hemorrhagic fever (Nairoviridae), Rift 46 
Valley fever [Phenuiviridae], Ebola virus disease and Marburg virus disease [Filoviridae], Nipah 47 
and Hendra virus disease [Paramyxoviridae], and Lassa fever [Arenaviridae]).  48 
     49 
Table 1. Characteristics of selected emerging/re-emerging viruses 
 
Virus Family Particle size 
Lipid 
Envelope 
Genome* 
(segments) 
Reservoir 
species 
References 
Lassa virus Arenaviridae 110-130 nm yes ±ssRNA(2) rodent 6,61 
SFTSV† Phenuiviridae 80-100 nm yes -ssRNA(3) tick 9 
Hantaan virus Hantaviridae 80-120 nm yes -ssRNA(3) rodent 7,8,62 
MERS-CoV Coronaviridae 118-136 nm yes +ssRNA(1) bat 2,18,63 
SARS-CoV Coronaviridae 80-90 nm yes +ssRNA(1) bat 2,18,63 
SARS-CoV-2 Coronaviridae 60-140 nm yes +ssRNA(1) bat‡ 4,15,64 
Ebola virus Filoviridae 80 × 14000 nm yes -ssRNA(1) bat 61 
Influenza H5N1 Orthomyxoviridae 80-120 nm yes -ssRNA(8) avian 65 
Nipah virus Paramyxoviridae 40-1900 nm yes -ssRNA(1) bat 5 
EV-D68 Picornaviridae ~30 nm no +ssRNA(4) unknown 16,66 
*Abbreviations used: ±, ambisense; -, negative sense; +, positive sense; ss, single-stranded. 50 
Segments (1) equates to a non-segmented genome. †Now referred to as Huaiyangshan 51 
banyangvirus.‡Suspected primary host based on >90% sequence homology to bat coronaviruses 52 
63. 53 
 54 
     The emerging/re-emerging viruses shown in Table 1, with the exception of enterovirus D68, 55 
each are relatively large, enveloped, zoonotic viruses with single-stranded RNA genomes. 56 
Enterovirus D68 (EV-D68), a small non-enveloped virus of the Picornaviridae family is an 57 
example of a re-emerging virus from that family. While EV-D68, may also be zoonotic11,12, a 58 
reservoir species has yet to be identified.  59 
    Aside from the characteristics described in Table 1, what other commonalities exist for these 60 
emerging/re-emerging zoonotic viruses? Can we use these commonalities as the basis for 61 
proposing approaches for infection prevention and control (IPAC)? In the remainder of this 62 
review, we examine various aspects of the emerging/re-emerging viruses that are important in 63 
formulating approaches for IPAC, namely transmissibility, infectivity, viral shedding, 64 
environmental survival, and expectations regarding microbicidal efficacy for targeted hygiene 65 
practices. This information may then be leveraged to effectively mitigate the health risks 66 
associated with SARS-CoV-2 and its associated disease (COVID-19), as well as with future 67 
emerging/re-emerging enveloped viruses. 68 
Transmissibility of Emerging/Re-emerging Viruses  69 
According to several authors13,15, sustained person-to-person transmission of viruses is favored 70 
by certain viral characteristics, including lack of a lipid envelope, small particle size, limited 71 
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genomic segmentation, and low mortality of the associated disease13-15. Tropism of the virus for 72 
the liver, central nervous system (CNS), or the respiratory tract, and lack of vector-borne 73 
transmission also appear to favor sustained person-to-person transmission13,14. On the other hand, 74 
possession of an RNA vs. a DNA genome was not found to contribute to the likelihood of such 75 
sustained transmission13,14.  76 
    It is of interest that many of the viral characteristics mentioned above that are considered 77 
predictive of sustained person-to-person transmissibility are not shared by the viruses associated 78 
with the World Health Organization (WHO) diseases of concern10. Namely, all of the 79 
emerging/re-emerging diseases mentioned in the WHO list10 involve relatively large enveloped 80 
viruses with ssRNA genomes, many of which are segmented. Of the emerging/re-emerging 81 
viruses listed in Table 1, only EV-D68 is a small, non-enveloped virus. In addition, many of the 82 
listed viruses exhibit high human mortality (Tables 1 and 2).  83 
 84 
Table 2. Transmission and mortality of emerging/re-emerging viruses 
 
Virus Tropism for organs 
Mode of 
transmission* 
Mortality Reference 
Lassa virus Vascular system Contact, aerosols  15-20% 25,61 
SFTSV Vascular system Vector (tick) 12-30% 9,67 
Hantaan virus Lower respiratory, renal Contact, Aerosols 1-15%  61,62,68,69 
MERS-CoV Lower respiratory, GI Contact, aerosols 34-36% 25,42,70,71 
SARS-CoV Lower respiratory  Contact, aerosols 15 ± 11% 25,72 
SARS-CoV-2 Lower respiratory, GI Contact, aerosols   7% 3,19 
Ebola virus Vascular system Contact, aerosols 41% 25,42,73 
Influenza H5N1 Upper respiratory  Contact, aerosols >60% 25,74 
Nipah virus CNS, respiratory Contact, ingestion 65 ± 28% 5,27 
EV-D68 Respiratory, CNS Aerosols, contact Up to 10% 66,75 
*”Contact” refers to contact with bodily fluids or with fomites; “aerosols” equates to respiratory 85 
aerosols/droplets. CNS, central nervous system, GI, gastrointestinal 86 
 87 
   Certain predictive factors13-15 that do seem to be shared by the emerging/re-emerging viruses in 88 
the list in Table 1 include tropism for the respiratory tract or the CNS, and lack of vector-borne 89 
transmission. While most enteroviruses are less susceptible to acid and are disseminated by the 90 
fecal-oral route, EV-D68 is acid-labile and has a lower temperature optimum, reflecting its 91 
tropism for the upper respiratory tract rather than the gastrointestinal tract (i.e., EV-D68 acts 92 
more like a rhinovirus than an enterovirus)16.  93 
    It is unknown if sustained person-to-person transmissibility necessarily equates to a high level 94 
of concern for an emergent zoonotic virus. For instance, there appears to be no evidence that 95 
Hendra virus (another zoonotic enveloped virus) has shown person-to-person transmission17, yet 96 
this virus is similar to Nipah virus in many respects and is of concern, due its high mortality rate 97 
in humans. 98 
    As mentioned in Table 2, the most common modes of transmission for the emerging/re-99 
emerging viruses discussed in this review are contact with infected bodily secretions/excretions 100 
and contaminated fomites, especially high-touch surfaces (HITES), and inhalation of respiratory 101 
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droplets/aerosols containing infectious virus (Fig 1). The intermediacy of hands in transmission 102 
through contact is emphasized in Fig. 1. 103 
 104 
 105 
Figure 1. Modes of transmission of viruses, emphasizing respiratory infections such as SARS-106 
CoV, MERS-CoV, and SARS-COV-2 (modified from Otter et al.18). 107 
 108 
    The animal-to-human and person-to-person transmission of SARS-CoV-2 and associated 109 
COVID-19 disease appears to occur in a manner similar to that described for MERS-CoV and 110 
SARS-CoV. 111 
Infectivity and Virus Shedding of Emerging/Re-emerging Viruses  112 
The infectivity of a virus refers to its ability to initiate infection of host cell with production of 113 
viral progeny. The infectious dose50 (ID50) is the smallest number of infectious virus particles 114 
that will lead to infection of 50% of an exposed population20, and is dependent a number of 115 
factors, such as the species, age, or race of the host, the receptor, immune, and nutritional status 116 
of the host or host tissues, and the portal of entry of the virus. In the case of most viruses, only a 117 
percentage of those infected actually develop clinical illness21. Those who remain asymptomatic 118 
represent subclinical cases of the infection in whom the virus may still replicate and be released 119 
into the environment. IPAC may be difficult in the face of such silent disseminators (virus 120 
carriers/shedders). Exposure to as low as one infectious viral particle has a probability of causing 121 
an infection leading to disease, although that probability varies from virus to virus22. Typically, 122 
infectious doses are empirically derived and reported in units of 50% infective dose (ID50) values 123 
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that reflect the doses capable of infecting half of the subjects exposed. As prospective studies in 124 
humans of highly pathogenic viral diseases with potentially fatal outcomes cannot ethically be 125 
performed, very limited data exist on the infectivity of the emerging/re-emerging viruses in 126 
Table 1. Where studies have been performed using animals, extrapolations of such data to 127 
humans must be made with caution.  128 
    The estimates that have been reported for viruses listed in Tables 1 and 2 are discussed below, 129 
acknowledging the unavoidable variability in literature with regard to such assessments of 130 
infectivity. It has been stated that 1-10 infectious aerosolized Ebola virus particles can cause an 131 
infection in humans23,24. A similar range has been reported for the Lassa virus25. Influenza virus 132 
infectivity values specific to the H5N1 and H7N9 strains are not known22 but estimates of 100 to 133 
1000 infectious viral particles have been reported22,25. The human infective dose for SARS-CoV 134 
has been estimated at 16 to 160 plaque-forming units26. Data on the human infectious doses for 135 
MERS-CoV, SFTSV, Nipah virus, and EV-D68 have not been reported. Until such data become 136 
available, it should be assumed that these emerging/re-emerging viruses, including SARS-CoV-137 
2, have relatively low ID50 values. 138 
     Once infected with one of these emerging/re-emerging viruses, during the prodromal period 139 
before actual appearance of symptoms, as well as once symptoms appear, the infected individual 140 
may become a shedder of infectious particles. The extent to which virus shedding might lead to 141 
dissemination of the associated disease depends upon a number of factors, including the amount 142 
of virus released (shed), the infectivity of the virus within the released matrix (droplets/aerosols, 143 
fecal/diarrheal discharge, and other excretions including respiratory secretions), and the survival 144 
of the released viruses within such matrices once dried on HITES. Extent of virus shedding, 145 
unfortunately, is commonly measured through detection of genomic materiale.g., 18,22,27,28, rather 146 
than through use of infectivity assays, so there are only limited data available on infectious viral 147 
shedding.  148 
    As displayed in Fig. 1, transmission of respiratory infections commonly involves the 149 
intermediacy of the hand. The same can be said about gastrointestinal infections (i.e., through the 150 
fecal-oral route). The SARS-CoV, MERS-CoV, and SARS-CoV-2 have been reported18,19 to be 151 
shed from patients both within respiratory and gastrointestinal secretions/excretions, therefore it 152 
is likely that contaminated HITES and respiratory droplets/aerosols also play an important role in 153 
dissemination of the SARS-CoV-2 through the intermediacy of hands. 154 
Viral Survival on Environmental Surfaces and in Air 155 
Knowledge of the transmissibility and infectivity of emerging/re-emerging viruses enables one to 156 
assess the risk of spread of a viral disease in the case that infectious virus is shed from an 157 
infected individual and is deposited on environmental surfaces/fomites or in droplets/aerosols. 158 
Another important factor to consider when assessing risk is the survival (i.e., the continued 159 
infectivity) of these viruses on the environmental surfaces/fomites or in air in the form of 160 
droplets/aerosols.  161 
   There is much more information addressing survival of infectious viruses on environmental 162 
surfaces than in aerosols. The data that are available address a number of environmental factors 163 
of relevance18, including the types and porosities of the surfaces, the matrices in which the 164 
viruses have been suspended prior to being deposited onto the surfaces the temperature and 165 
relative humidity (RH), and methods used for measuring survival (e.g., log10 reduction in 166 
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infectivity per unit time, infectivity half-life, etc., infectious titer after a measured duration, etc.). 167 
For Table 3, the results that have been displayed focus on room temperature (ambient) conditions 168 
at relatively low and medium RH. Table 3 should not, therefore, be considered to represent a 169 
comprehensive review of literature for survival of these viruses. For a more systematic review of 170 
coronaviruses survival on environmental surfaces under various conditions, see the reviews by 171 
Otter et al.18 and Kampf et al.29. For certain viruses (e.g., SFTSV), survival data are not yet 172 
available, so data for surrogate viruses from the same or similar families are shown. Persistence 173 
of SARS-CoV-2 on surfaces and in air has recently been reported by van Doremalen et al.30 174 
SARS-CoV-2 was found to remain viable in aerosols for at least 3 hours, and for up to 24 hours 175 
on cardboard and 2 to 3 days on plastic and stainless steel surfaces30.  176 
  177 
Table 3. Environmental survival of emerging/re-emerging viruses at room 
temperature 
 
Virus Survival on surfaces 
Survival in 
aerosols 
Reference 
Lassa virus 0.41 log10/d (glass) t½ = 0.62 h 76,77 
SFTSV t½ = 0.75 h (aluminum)† No data 78 
Hantaan virus t½ = 1.0 h (aluminum) No data 78 
MERS-CoV t½ = 0.94 h (steel) t½ = 27 h* 31,71 
SARS-CoV t½ = 10 h (steel), 18 h (plastic) At least 3 h¶ 30,72 
SARS-CoV-2 t½ = 13 h (steel), 16 h (plastic) At least 3 h¶ 30 
Ebola virus 0.68 log10/d (glass) 
0.88 log10/d (steel) 
t½ = 0.25 h 39,73,76,79,80 
 
Influenza H5N1 <1 d (glass, metal) No data 65 
Nipah virus 1 h (plastic) No data 79 
EV-D68 t½ = 0.17 to 0.25 h (steel)‡ No data 81 
†No data for SFTSV are available, the result displayed is for Crimean-Congo virus.  178 
*Aerosol data for coronavirus 229E31. Survival half-life depended on humidity. The values 179 
ranged from 3.3 h (~80% RH), 67 h (50% RH), to 27 h (30% RH). 180 
‡No data for EV-D68 are available; the result displayed is for human rhinovirus type 14 at 15-181 
55% RH65. 182 
¶The authors only evaluated times up to 3 h. 183 
   184 
Hierarchy of Microbicidal Efficacy for Inactivating Pathogens  185 
Infectious virus survival in aerosols or on HITES represents a source for dissemination of 186 
emerging /re-emerging viruses, including SARS-CoV-2. The enveloped viruses listed in Tables 1 187 
and 2 should be relatively susceptible to the inactivating activity of a variety of microbicides, as 188 
discussed below. Sattar32 previously has advanced the concept of utilizing the known knowledge 189 
of the susceptibility human viral pathogens to chemical disinfecting agents (microbicides)33,34 to 190 
predict the efficacy of such agents for inactivating emerging /re-emerging viral pathogens. This 191 
concept, referred to as a hierarchy of susceptibility to microbicides32,33, is portrayed in Fig. 2. As 192 
shown, pathogenic agents can be viewed as displaying a continuum of susceptibilities to 193 
microbicides, with enveloped viruses at the bottom of this hierarchy, highlighting their relatively 194 
high susceptibilities to formulated microbicides32,33.   195 
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      Among pathogens, prions are considered to be the least sensitive to microbicides, requiring 196 
highly caustic solutions for inactivation. Bacterial spores and protozoan cysts/oocysts are next on 197 
the microbicidal susceptibility spectrum. Small, non-enveloped viruses are considered to be less 198 
susceptible to microbicides, although have increased susceptibility to high pH, oxidizers such as 199 
sodium hypochlorite, formulated hydrogen peroxide, alcohols, and a variety of microbicidal 200 
actives, relative to spores and protozoan cysts/oocysts. Mycobacteria, fungi, vegetative bacteria 201 
and enveloped viruses appear to be less resistant to certain formulated microbicides, such as 202 
alcohols, oxidizers, quaternary ammonium compounds (QAC), and phenolics (e.g., p-chloro-m-203 
xylenol)29,32-45.  204 
    205 
 206 
Figure 2. Hierarchy of sensitivity of pathogens to formulated chemical microbicides (adapted 207 
from Sattar32). Data are from a variety of sources29,32-45. 208 
 209 
     It is of interest that the enveloped viruses are considered to be the most susceptible to a 210 
variety of formulated microbicidal actives, even more so than fungi and vegetative bacteria, 211 
yeast, and mycobacteria (Fig. 2). Viral envelopes are typically derived from portions of the host 212 
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cell membrane and therefore comprise host cell phospholipids and proteins (Fig. 3), as well as 213 
some virally inserted glycoproteins. Since the envelopes contain lipid material, they are readily 214 
destroyed by phenolics such as p-chloro-m-xylenol (PCMX), oxidizing agents such as sodium 215 
hypochlorite and activated hydrogen peroxide, quaternary ammonium compounds, alcohols, and 216 
detergents. Even mild detergents such as soap may inactivate enveloped viruses by denaturing 217 
the lipoproteins in the envelope. This makes them more susceptible to most of the formulated 218 
virucidal microbicides commonly used for IPAC.  219 
      220 
 221 
 222 
Figure 3. Ultrastructural differences between enveloped and non-enveloped viruses. 223 
Genotypically, these viral genomes may be single-or double-stranded, and segmented or non-224 
segmented (examples are not shown in the figure). 225 
 226 
    It can be assumed as a starting point, therefore, that the enveloped emerging/re-emerging 227 
viruses listed in Table 1 should be readily inactivated by a variety of formulated microbicidal 228 
actives. This assumption has, in fact, been verified by extensive empirical data29,32-40,42-44, and 229 
has been embraced by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency46. The data for various 230 
members of the Coronaviridae family have recently been reviewed by Kampf et al.29, and these 231 
data support the expectation that SARS-CoV-2 and other coronaviruses of concern (e.g., MERS-232 
CoV, SARS-CoV, mouse hepatitis virus, porcine epidemic diarrhea virus, etc.) should be readily 233 
inactivated by commonly employed and commercially available microbicides, including QAC. 234 
In addition, a European guidance document47 recently has been issued that lists a variety of 235 
microbicidal agents that have demonstrated efficacy against a variety of human and animal 236 
coronaviruses, and that, therefore, could be applied for decontamination of surfaces in non-237 
healthcare facilities. 238 
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    Aqueous solutions of the phenolic, PCMX, at concentrations of 0.12 -0.48% by weight were 239 
shown to inactivate >4 log10 of infectious Ebola virus - Makona variant (EBOV/Mak) suspended 240 
in an organic load and evaluated in liquid inactivation studies43,48 or dried on a steel surface in a 241 
carrier inactivation study48.  In each case, complete inactivation of ≥6.8 log10 of EBOV/Mak was 242 
observed after contact times ≥5 min. In addition, EBOV/Mak dried on prototypic steel carriers 243 
was completely inactivated (≥6.5 log10) by aqueous solutions of 70% ethanol or 0.5% or 1% 244 
NaOCl (≥0.5%) after contact times ≥2.5 min39.  245 
     Microbicidal formulations based on oxidizing agents, QAC, alcohols, phenolics, and 246 
aldehydes displaying virucidal efficacy for enveloped viruses and relatively less susceptible non-247 
enveloped viruses (such as human norovirus surrogates) have been recommended for 248 
decontaminating environmental surfaces or materials used for food preparation49,50. The efficacy 249 
of ethanol and QAC actives for inactivating the norovirus surrogate feline calicivirus depends on 250 
how the microbicides are formulated. Factors such as the addition of an alkaline agent were 251 
found to increase their efficacy51. Microbicides satisfying these requirements can be regarded as 252 
effective against emerging/re-emerging viruses such as SARS-CoV-2. Following this logic, the 253 
U.S. EPA has invoked an Emerging Viral Pathogen Policy in the past for the 2009 pandemic 254 
influenza, for the Ebola virus, and most recently for SARS-CoV-252.  255 
    In the case of highly pathogenic emerging/re-emerging viruses such as SARS-CoV-2, 256 
effective and frequent targeted hygiene using appropriate microbicides is essential for prevention 257 
of dissemination. Practicing hygiene inappropriately and only once daily may not be sufficient. 258 
For instance, infectious coronavirus 229E was detected on HITES (e.g., door knobs) in a 259 
university classroom in which samples were collected daily over a one-week period53. Vigilant 260 
decontamination of HITES becomes of paramount importance when dealing with highly 261 
pathogenic viruses with relatively low human infectious doses, as is the case with many of the 262 
emerging/re-emerging viruses, including SARS-CoV-2, being discussed in this review.  263 
    The enveloped emerging/re-emerging viruses listed in Table 1 display high susceptibility to 264 
inactivation by ultraviolet light at 254 nm, an inactivation approach amendable to inactivation of 265 
aerosolized viruses31. For instance, empirical data54 for Lassa virus, Hantavirus, and Ebola virus, 266 
and for the virus families (Coronaviridae, Orthomxyoviridae, Paramyxoviridae, Phenuiviridae) 267 
indicate that UV fluencies of 3 to 14 mJ/cm2 should inactivate 4 log10 of the enveloped viruses in 268 
Table 1. These fluency values are relatively low, compared to those needed to inactivate 4 log10 269 
of the least susceptible viruses, such as those of the Adenoviridae (98-222 mJ/cm2) and 270 
Polyomaviridae (235-364 mJ/cm2) families of non-enveloped viruses55. 271 
Personal Hygiene Practices for Preventing Infectious Virus Acquisition  272 
A 2005 study on SARS-CoV indicated the presence of genomic material for that virus in air and 273 
on HITES within a SARS patient’s room56, indicating the likelihood of airborne droplet 274 
transmission for this coronavirus. This suggests that appropriate respiratory protection, as well as 275 
targeted HITES decontamination and hand hygiene, represent important interventional practices 276 
for limiting virus dissemination during outbreaks such as that occurring now with SARS-CoV-2. 277 
    The WHO has posted on their website a webpage entitled Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) 278 
advice for the public57. Basic protective measures against SARS-CoV-2 recommended by the 279 
WHO57 include: frequent hand washing with soap and water or an alcohol-based rub, and 280 
maintenance of social distancing (at least 1m, see Fig 1) especially in the presence of people who 281 
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are coughing, sneezing, or have a fever. The latter recommendation is applicable to any of the 282 
viruses listed in Table 2 for which transmission by respiratory aerosols is expected. Avoidance of 283 
touching eyes, nose, mouth, or other mucus membranes with hands post-contact with HITES is 284 
also recommended57. As displayed in Fig 1, the hands play an important role in transfer of 285 
infectious virus from contaminated HITES to susceptible host’s mucus membranes, enabling 286 
virus-host interactions initiating infection. Following the appropriate hygiene practices described 287 
above can potentially help in prevention and control of emerging and re-emerging viruses, 288 
including the currently circulating SARS-CoV-2.   289 
Discussion  290 
As Dr. Anthony Fauci eloquently stated in 200558 “Public health officials once suggested that it 291 
might someday be possible to ‘close the book’ on the study and treatment of infectious diseases. 292 
However, it is now clear that endemic diseases as well as newly emerging ones (e.g., severe 293 
acute respiratory syndrome [SARS]), reemerging ones (e.g., West Nile virus), and even 294 
deliberately disseminated infectious diseases (e.g., anthrax from bioterrorism) continue to pose a 295 
substantial threat throughout the world.” Recent experience certainly verifies these predictions. 296 
Weber et al.41 have correctly emphasized that “Preventing disease acquisition via person-to-297 
person transmission or contact with the contaminated environment depends on rapid and 298 
appropriate institution of isolation precautions, appropriate hand hygiene, and appropriate 299 
disinfection of medical equipment, devices, and the environmental surfaces. Importantly, once 300 
the nature of the emerging infectious agent is known (i.e., enveloped virus, bacteria, fungi, 301 
nonenveloped virus, mycobacteria, or non-enveloped virus), it is possible to determine the 302 
appropriate hygienic interventions. For example, an enveloped virus (e.g., Ebola, MERS-CoV) 303 
or vegetative bacterium (e.g., CRE, MRSA) would be inactivated by any formulated 304 
microbicidal active(s) known to be effective against vegetative bacteria, filamentous fungi, 305 
mycobacteria, or non-enveloped viruses.”41.  306 
   It is fortunate, though perhaps a little perplexing, that so many of the emerging/re-emerging 307 
viruses (examples listed in Table 1 and below) are enveloped viruses. It is not clear why there are 308 
not more small, non-enveloped viruses mentioned in the WHO list of viral diseases of concern10. 309 
The small non-enveloped viruses are much less susceptible to commonly employed cleaning 310 
agents (antiseptics, detergents, non-formulated microbicidal actives) and, in general, display 311 
relatively longer survival on environmental surfaces. According to theoretical modeling of 312 
sustained person-to-person transmissibility12-14, small non-enveloped viruses are predicted to be 313 
more likely to lead to sustained infections within the community. The reality is that the 314 
emerging/re-emerging viruses of concern, both in humans and in economically important 315 
animals, have more typically included enveloped viruses. Recent examples include porcine 316 
epidemic diarrhea virus, MERS-CoV, SARS-CoV and SARS-CoV-2 (Coronaviridae), African 317 
swine fever virus (Asfarviridae), Schmallenberg virus (Peribunyaviridae), Crimean-Congo 318 
hemorrhagic fever virus (Nairoviridae), Rift Valley fever virus (Phenuiviridae), and West Nile 319 
virus and Zika virus (Flaviviridae), Hantaviruses (Hantaviridae), and Lassa viruses 320 
(Bunyaviridae). 321 
   The fact that the emerging/re-emerging viruses are predominantly RNA viruses might be 322 
explained in part by the notion59 that RNA viruses can more readily adapt to the rapidly changing 323 
global and local environment due to the high error rate of the polymerases that replicate their 324 
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genomes. The RNA viruses are thought therefore to display higher evolution rates through 325 
mutation, gnomonic reassortment, or recombination.  326 
   The likelihood of experiencing future emergent zoonotic viruses is high60, and therefore 327 
defining in advance appropriate approaches for limiting spread of such viruses through IPAC is 328 
essential. We now have the sequencing tools necessary for rapidly identifying a novel virus such 329 
as SARS-CoV-2, the genetic sequence of which was determined within just over one week4. 330 
Provided that a novel emerging virus is found to be a member of a viral family for which we 331 
have sufficient microbicidal data available, including IPAC expertise, it should be possible to 332 
make accurate predictions as to viral transmission, survival on surfaces, and microbicidal 333 
efficacy. SARS-CoV-2 is no exception in this regard. 334 
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